Agent-based modelling can be used to investigate the behavioural and social aspects of tax compliance. We illustrate the approach with two models. The …rst model emphasises the role of occupational choice in tax compliance, and explores the e¤ect of non-compliance on risk-taking and income distribution. The modelling of the compliance decision is discussed with an emphasis on decision-making under uncertainty and social interaction. We then add to the model a social network which governs the transmission of information on attitudes and beliefs, and investigate alternative audit strategies. A strategy of auditing a …xed number of taxpayers from each occupation dominates alternative strategies (including random and focussed strategies) in the sense of …rst-order stochastic dominance.
Introduction
The economic analysis of tax compliance has the objectives of explaining and predicting compliance behaviour. Achievement of these objectives is essential for the design of bene…cial interventions that increase the level of compliance and raise revenue. There are several di¤erent research methodologies that can contribute to this programme of research. Theoretical analysis can develop models that are evaluated by empirical studies and tested using lab and …eld experiments. The focus of this paper is a further methodology that can be usefully applied to analyze compliance: agent-based modelling. This is a research methodology that is steadily gaining in popularity due to its ‡exibility and potential sophistication. We hope that the paper will demonstrate that agent-based modelling can yield fresh insights when applied to the study of compliance.
A successful application of agent-based modelling uses the best of economic theory to describe the behaviour of agents with heterogeneous characteristics and allows for interaction among these agents in a rich environment. The components of economic theory on which we focus are recent behavioural advances in understanding of the compliance decision, the e¤ect of occupational choice in creating opportunities for non-compliance, and the role of social networks in the transmission of information. In brief, our model of the compliance decision and policy intervention combines attitudes towards compliance, beliefs about audit strategy, and opportunities for evasion. It also recognizes the social setting in which the compliance decision is made.
The paper describes the theoretical background of the modelling and the numerical results from two di¤erent agent-based models. The …rst model focuses on occupational choice and the distributional consequences of non-compliance. The second model generalizes the …rst by adding repeated social interaction and the transmission of attitudes and beliefs in a dynamic setting. The models demonstrate that non-compliance increases inequality and risk-taking in the economy, and that di¤erent compliance behaviours can be established within occupational groups. It is also possible that taxpayers, on average, can systematically hold a belief about the probability of audit that remains consistently above the true rate. When audit strategies are compared we …nd that a strategy of auditing a …xed number of individuals within each occupational group delivers a higher level of revenue than strategies with randomness across groups or a systematic focus on groups.
Section 2 provides a descriptive introduction to agent-based modelling. Successful application of agent-based modelling requires a credible model of individual choice. In our context the role of opportunities for non-compliance is central. Section 3 consequently implements an agent-based model with choice of occupation using an extension of the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) framework. We then extend the model further to incorporate advances from behavioural economics, including the endogenous development of attitudes and beliefs within a social network. Section 4 reviews the literature on behavioural explanations of the individual compliance decision, and Section 5 describes how the behavioural concepts are implemented in the model. The paper is completed in Section 6 by analyzing the choice of audit strategy in an agent-based model that includes network e¤ects and behavioural assumptions on preferences. Section 7 concludes the paper.
Agent-Based Modelling
Agent-based modelling is a computer simulation technique that is increasing in popularity for the study of economic and social behaviour. It involves the construction of a set of agents and an environment in which they interact, and has proved useful in many di¤erent areas of natural science and social science. There have been numerous economic applications (surveyed in Tesfatsion, 2006) and several previous studies of tax compliance (Andrei et al., in press; Bloomquist, 2004 , Davis et al., 2003 Korobow et al., 2007) . Before describing what our work contributes to this literature, we provide in this section a general introduction to agent-based modelling.
To implement an agent-based model the …rst step is to de…ne the agents that will interact and the environment in which the interaction takes place. In general, an individual agent will be characterized by their ability, objective, and information set. Some of the characteristics will be …xed at the outset of the simulation (e.g. ability) but others may be updated by experience (e.g. information). In economic applications agents are typically assigned an objective such as maximization of income or utility and make choices to achieve the objective. This need not be the case, and in many other areas of science agents can be mechanistic (e.g. interaction of particles controlled by the laws of dynamics) or simply random (e.g. very basic biological interaction). The number of agents and the distribution of characteristics of agents can be chosen according to the context of the research question or selected by a random process.
The second step is to construct the environment within which the agents interact. An economic environment could be a market place with trading rules or an economy with some set of institutions that govern interaction. An application in physics may involve placing particles in a dust cloud, or placing animals in a …eld for an application in biology.
There may also be randomness involved in the choice of the environment.
Given the agents and the environment, the …nal step is to allow the agents to interact (economic agents can buy and sell, or particles collide and coalesce) and to observe the outcome. If there are multiple periods of interaction then both the dynamic process and its steady states can be of interest. These will be governed by the initial state of the system, by the choices made by the agents, and by any random components during the interaction. The parameters of the system, or the probability distributions governing choice of parameters, can be varied to test the e¤ect of their choice on the outcome.
The government can either be an agent that chooses policy, or else it can be part of the environment with policy as a parameter.
A classic agent-based model of nature is that of the predator-prey relationship. An implementation of this is available in the free Netlogo software (http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/) that provides a platform for developing agent-based models. The Wolf Sheep Predation model is set in a grassy landscape. The sheep wander randomly around the landscape eating grass and reproducing. The wolves also move randomly around the landscape until they encounter sheep which they devour. Movement costs wolves energy so they must eat sheep to survive. If a wolf does not …nd any sheep it will eventually run out of energy and die. The purpose of the simulation is to describe the evolution of the two populations. A range of free software is available for undertaking agent-based simulations. For an economist the usefulness of this software is typically limited by the fact that it does not permit agents to undertake complex optimization within the simulations. This is important in many applications since it is the inclusion of optimal choice that distinguishes economic behaviour from modelling in the natural sciences. For some models it may be possible to compute explicit solutions to the optimization problems in which case the free software is adequate. Whenever a numerical optimization sub-routine is required, as it is in the models described in the following sections, it is necessary to employ suitable software (such as Matlab) for writing dedicated codes.
Risk-Taking and Income Distribution
A key element for understanding the compliance decision is the role the opportunity for non-compliance plays in the choice of occupation. Working as a paid employee either rules out non-compliance, if labour income is subject to a withholding tax (such as the PAYE system in the UK), or makes successful non-compliance very unlikely, if there is a system of third-party reporting. In contrast, choosing to be self-employed and accepting the responsibility for tax …ling opens the opportunity for non-compliance. It is through this channel that occupational choice is inter-linked with the compliance decision.
There is a second aspect of occupational choice that is also linked to the compliance decision. It is generally true that the level of income received from employment is more certain than the income that will be generated from self-employment. This implies that choosing self-employment also involves accepting greater income risk and, therefore, all else constant, the self-employed will have a lower degree of risk aversion than the employed.
This directly determines the extent of non-compliance: the amount of income that is not declared increases as risk aversion decreases. In this way occupational choice self-selects those who will evade most into an occupation where they have the opportunity to evade.
Our …rst example of agent-based modelling incorporates occupational choice into a compliance model. This is achieved by extending the model of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) to permit each individual, …rst, to make an occupational choice and, second, to make an evasion decision based on the realization of income. The model can be seen as a generalization of the work of Pestieau and Possen (1991) . The focus of the simulation is the e¤ect that non-compliance has upon the amount of risk-taking in the economy and income distribution.
The model has three occupations. Employment is modelled as a safe occupation with a …xed wage that can di¤er among individuals. There is no opportunity to be noncompliant in employment due either to the operation of a withholding tax or through third-party reporting. The other two occupations are di¤erent forms of self-employment.
Self-employment is intended to represent running a small business, and so the income is assumed to be risky. However, it is possible to evade tax on income from self-employment since it is not subject to the same degree of third-party reporting. We adopt the natural assumption that each self-employed person makes a compliance decision after the (random) income from self-employment is realized. The choice of occupation is made by comparing the utility derived from employment to the expected utility (taking into account optimal compliance for each income realization) from the two self-employment occupations. The occupation that delivers the highest utility is chosen. In this simulation the occupational choice decision is made once. In the simulations of sections 5 and 6 it is made at the start of every period because the choice may change as the information of the taxpayer evolves through the interaction with others.
The simulation randomly assigns to each taxpayer a set of four characteristics, fw; ; s 1 ; s 2 g, where w is the wage in employment, is the coe¢ cient of (relative) risk aversion in a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function, and s i is the level of skill in selfemployment occupation i. The income earned from self-employment in occupation i is s i y i where y i is drawn from a beta distribution g ( ).
1 The variable y i can be interpreted as local market conditions, so that income is determined jointly by individual skill and market conditions. The draw of y i is unique for each taxpayer, so in a given round of simulation, a low-skill individual in occupation i may earn more that a high-skill individual if the former obtains a bene…cial draw of y i . It is assumed that (y 1 ) < (y 2 ) and 2 (y 1 ) < 2 (y 2 ), so that for a given skill level self-employed occupation 2 has a higher mean income but also a greater variance of income. We therefore refer to occupation 2 as being riskier than occupation 1. If a taxpayer has realized outcome s i y i from self-employment i the amount of income that is not declared, E i (y i ), is determined by
Taking account of the choice of E i ; the expected utility from self-employed occupation i is then
The expected payo¤s from the three occupations fU 0 ; EU 1 ; EU 2 g are compared (where occupation 0 is employment), and the maximum payo¤ determines the chosen occupation.
The agent-based simulation performs the following steps:
1. Individual characteristics are randomly drawn;
2. Occupation is chosen given characteristics;
3. Incomes are realized and the compliance decision is made;
4. The tax authority conducts random audits and punishes any evasion that is detected.
The outcome is calculated for two di¤erent scenarios. The …rst scenario assumes that all income is honestly declared. This provides a baseline from which to judge the e¤ect of non-compliance. The second scenario assumes that non-compliance takes place. Each simulation has 1000 individuals and is repeated 100 times. The data are averaged across the 100 rounds in order to smooth out the consequences of randomness. The following parameters were used for an illustrative example: tax rate is 25 percent, each self-employed taxpayer is audited with probability of 5 percent, and the …ne rate is 150 percent of evaded tax.
Our …rst two …gures compare the distribution of occupational choices between the two scenarios. Figure 1 shows the distribution of taxpayers across the three occupations with honesty. The three occupations are on the horizontal axis and the vertical axis shows the number of taxpayers in each occupation. The distribution when non-compliance is possible is shown in Figure 2 . Comparing the …gures shows that non-compliance causes the distribution of occupational choices to shift away from employment toward the two risky self-employment occupations. As a consequence there is more occupational risktaking when non-compliance is possible. In addition to this increase in occupational risk-taking there is a further increase in total risk-taking in the economy because some of the taxpayers choosing self-employment are also evading. Hence, the total amount of risk-taking in the economy is increased by the existence of tax evasion. This observation is interesting in view of past discussion (Kanbur 1981, Black and de Meza 1997) on the e¢ ciency of risk-taking in competitive economies.
The e¤ect of non-compliance on income distribution is presented in two ways. Table   1 provides summary statistics of the income distributions with and without evasion, and …gure 3 plots the Lorenz curves for the two distributions. The e¤ect of non-compliance is to increase the mean income level, where the mean is computed after both taxes and …nes have been imposed. Non-compliance also increases the inequality of income as measured by the Gini coe¢ cient. Figure 3 shows that there is Lorenz-curve dominance for the income distribution with honesty, and so the ranking is independent of the inequality index.
Another consequence of non-compliance is that those who fail to declare their true income do not pay the statutory tax rate. De…ne the e¤ective tax rate for a non-compliant taxpayer who is not audited by
and for a non-compliant taxpayer who is audited by
ET R N A will be below the statutory tax rate and ET R A will be above the statutory tax rate. The consequence of non-compliance by taxpayers is that the distribution of e¤ective tax rates is unrelated to income and does not correspond to the ‡at tax intended by the government. This point is illustrated in …gure 4 which displays a histogram of tax rates. This is tri-modal, re ‡ecting the three groups: non-compliant taxpayers who are The general observation is that non-compliance undermines the intended tax policy of the government.
These results illustrate some of the e¤ects that non-compliance can have upon the economy. The possibility of non-compliance encourages entry into risky occupations, while the consequence of non-compliance and auditing is increased inequality and a dispersion of the e¤ective tax rate. The agent-based model reported in this section shows the importance of introducing opportunities, but there are more features of the compliance decision that need to be taken into account. The next section therefore reviews recent literature on the applications of behavioural economics to the compliance decision.
Modelling Compliance
The properties of an agent-based model are determined by the behaviour of the individual agents. This implies that modelling the choice behaviour behind the compliance decision is key to obtaining interesting and credible insights. The aim when constructing a model should be to integrate the best of current theory and evidence. For the compliance decision this involves an acknowledgement of the limitations of the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model of tax compliance and the incorporation of ideas from behavioural economics. The purpose of this section is to brie ‡y review some models of the individual compliance decision. A more complete survey can be found in Hashimzade et al. (2013) .
Research on compliance behaviour has built on the Yitzhaki (1974) model which was itself a modi…cation of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) . Correspondinly, we refer to this below as the ASY model. The amount of evasion, E, is chosen to maximize expected utility
where p is the probability of audit, Y is income, t is the tax rate, and f is the …ne levied on tax evaded. The model takes the level of income as …xed. As we have already noted, the source of income is an important determinant of the opportunity for evasion due to thirdparty reporting and withholding on employment income. The inclusion of occupational choice is one of the central features of our agent-based models. For the present, we set this issue aside and focus on choices contingent on income.
The literature has identi…ed two problems with the predictions of the ASY model.
First, when confronted with the parameter values observed in practice the model predicts that all taxpayers should be non-compliant. Formally, the necessary and su¢ cient condition for E > 0 is
In practice, the value of f is rarely more than 2; so non-compliance occurs (E > 0) if p < 1=3. The exact value of p is information that only revenue services are party to, but no revenue service audits anywhere are even approaching one third of taxpayers. In this sense, all taxpayers should be non-compliant. Second, the predicted relationship between the amount of non-compliance and the tax rate is counter to intuitive expectation and counter to some (but not all) evidence. The formal result is that decreasing absolute risk aversion is a su¢ cient condition for dE dt < 0:
These results have led to a considerable research e¤ort to identify alternative models of the compliance decision that make predictions with greater conformity to the facts. The solutions proposed to improve the predictions of the model include appeal to non-expected utility theory and to social customs. We will discuss each of these in turn.
A general representation of non-expected utility choice theory is given by writing the value function, V , as
In (3) w i (p; 1 p); i = 1; 2; are weighting functions that translate the probabilities p and 1 p into more general weights. The typical assumption is that unlikely events are overweighted, so in the context of compliance w 1 (p; 1 p) > p: The function v( ) is a payo¤ function that can be more general than a utility function. For example, it is normally assumed that utility is concave (U 00 < 0) which is not a property that a value function need satisfy.
Within this general framework several alternatives have been proposed: The appearance of weighting functions (or beliefs) in these alternative preference structure can improve the predictions by making the su¢ cient condition for evasion tighter and individual-speci…c. However, they do not change the direction of the tax e¤ect to make dE=dt > 0. In addition, these alternatives can have their own shortcomings as explored in detail in Hashimzade et al. (2013) . Variants of prospect theory to describe tax compliance are used, for example, by Yaniv (1999) , al Nowaihi and Dhami (2007), and Bernasconi and Zanardi (2004) . A di¢ culty with this approach can be seen by adopting the standard Kahneman-Tversky value function
and choosing the reference point as income if the correct tax payment is made,
The payo¤ function then becomes
so that the optimal choice is either to comply in full or to declare no income. This is a simple consequence of the non-concavity of the objective function.
The existence of stigma from non-compliance and the existence of a social custom for compliance have identical formal representations. Correspondingly, we focus on social customs in what follows. A social custom is an informal rule of behaviour that summarizes the attitude toward compliance. A loss of social custom utility (or alternatively, a stigma cost or psychic cost) is incurred if the custom is broken
Across individuals there will be a cuto¤ such that i < =) E > 0 and i > =)
; (m the proportion of population evading) evasion becomes a social decision. Myles and Naylor (1996) show that i m (m; E) < 0 opens the possibility of multiple equilibria.
For some speci…cations of the stigma or social cost, it becomes possible to obtain dE=dt > 0. In a recent paper Piolatto and Rablen (2013) disentangle four distinct elements of prospect theory in their roles for the individual compliance decision; in particular, they …nd that probability weighting has no e¤ect upon the sign of dE=dt. Furthermore, they prove that when the expected utility theory model is augmented with stigma, or the psychic cost of non-compliance, it can overturn the sign of the tax e¤ect. Thus, prospect theory o¤ers no fundamental advantage over the expected utility theory with this particular modi…cation. Based on these observations, we do not need to feel bound by using either expected utility using objective probability or to be restricted by any of the particular alternatives to the expected utility theory. We proceed, therefore, by mixing subjective beliefs and stigma with convenient functional forms.
Attitudes, Beliefs and Network E¤ects
The empirical analysis of the determinants of tax evasion has demonstrated two important features. First, there is a strong evidence that the social setting in ‡uences the individual compliance decision. For example, individual perceptions of the justi…ability of tax evasion in a country are positively associated with the measures of aggregate tax evasion in that country, according to the World Values Survey (Slemrod 2007) . We refer to this e¤ect as the attitude to compliance, or attitude. An aggregate measure of the individual attitudes to compliance across a society can also be viewed as the tax morale prevailing in that society. One can think about the e¤ect of tax morale upon the individual attitudes to compliance as an externality: an individual who holds the view that non-compliance can be (sometimes) justi…ed contributes to the low tax morale in the society which, in turn, makes for that individual the decision to evade tax more easily acceptable.
Second, the probability of audit is not revealed to taxpayers by the revenue service.
Therefore, in the individual evaluation of the expected bene…t from evasion the probability of being audited and found to be non-compliant is subjective, rather than objective.
While the objective probability is part of the audit strategy of the revenue service, the subjective probabilities may be formed on the basis of individual experience and available information, and can, of course, be di¤erent for di¤erent individuals. To distinguish between the objective and the subjective probabilities we refer to the latter as the subjective belief, or just belief.
If attitudes and beliefs are determined, among other factors, by experience and information, it is natural to assume that they can evolve and change for a given individual over We have incorporated the dynamics of attitudes and beliefs into an agent-based model by adding to the individual compliance decision a process of learning within a social network according to the algorithm outlined below.
Networks and meetings
In an economy with N individuals the social network is described by a symmetric N N matrix A with A ij = 1 if individuals i and j are linked and A ij = 0 otherwise. The links are bi-directional: if i "knows" j then j "knows" i. 2 In our simulations the network is …xed at the outset and does not change; one can also introduce random or endogenous changes in the network structure. Time is divided into discrete periods, and in every period each individual chooses an occupation, earns income, and decides how much of this income to declare. Declarations are audited (according to some randomizing device as described below), after which individuals linked in the network randomly meet and exchange information.
Here we introduce two additional layers of randomness: not all individuals in the network meet in every period, and not every meeting results in an information exchange. This is implemented by introducing an N N matrix C of zeros and ones, drawn randomly in each period; this matrix represents the probabilities of meetings between individuals.
Thus, in each period a random selection of meetings occur described by an element-byelement product of A and C: individuals i and j meet during a period if A ij C ij = 1 and do not meet otherwise.
Furthermore, at a meeting of i and j information is exchanged only with some probability. It is possible to consider various patterns in the probability of information exchange; one plausible assumption is that the probability depends on the occupational groups to which i and j belong. More speci…cally, we assume that the probability of information exchange between i and j is higher when i and j belong to the same occupational group, and that it does not depend on their individual characteristics or other model parameters.
With three occupations, in general, six di¤erent probabilities can be introduced, denoted by q , where ; 2 fe; 1; 2g ; and q > q for all and 6 = .
Formation of beliefs
In period t individual i makes an occupational choice and (after income is realized) a compliance decision on the basis of the subjective belief, p i t , that i will be audited and caught if non-compliant. The belief is determined by audits prior to t (experience) and interaction with other individuals (information).
Audits and beliefs
The …rst updating e¤ect of an audit is that of experience and is described bỹ
where X allows ‡exibility in the modelling of the updating rule.
Two di¤erent mechanisms for the formation of subjective beliefs are considered, the target e¤ect and the bomb-crater e¤ect. With the target e¤ect, immediately after an audit the subjective belief rises, possibly to one, and then decays. In other words, if
i is audited and caught in period t he believes that now the tax authority will target him as an evader and will certainly or nearly certainly audit him again, but if i is not audited he believes that he is less likely to be a target and is less likely to be audited next time. In the simulations we assume the maximal target e¤ect and proportional decay:
With the bomb-crater e¤ect (e.g., Guala and Mittone, 2005) , immediately after an audit the belief falls, possibly to zero, and then rises. That is, if i is audited and caught in period t he believes that he is less likely to be audited again (a bomb is unlikely to hit a crater made by the previous bomb), but subsequently worries that his turn to be audited again is approaching. In the simulations we assume the maximal bomb-crater e¤ect and proportional increase:
2 (0; 1). The empirical evidence on which mechanism is correct is mixed and does not provide a decisive argument in favour of one over the other.
Information exchange and beliefs
The second updating e¤ect takes place at a meeting. Speci…cally, the individuals meet after audits take place, and their own subjective belief is updated, either according to the target mechanism or to the bomb-crater mechanism. If an information exchange occurs at a meeting between i and j, i's belief is further updated according to the rule
This can also be written
The belief p i t+1 is carried into the next period and is used when making occupational choice and evasion decision. A similar update takes place for individual j. Beliefs at time t = 0 in the simulations are assigned randomly.
Formation of attitudes
In the social custom approach to individual decision-making it is assumed that an individual derives additional utility if his or her decision is in line with the social custom (equivalently, utility is lost if the decision goes against social custom). In general, the importance of the social custom, or its weight in the utility function, can be speci…c for an individual. Since a social custom emerges in a society of interacting individuals, it is reasonable to assume that the weight assigned to the social custom by an individual is determined by interaction in the social network. For example, if the social custom is to pay taxes honestly, the weight will be higher when the number of honest taxpayers known to that individual is greater.
In the simulation the dynamic process for the importance of the social custom is implemented in the following way. Each individual i is randomly assigned a level of importance, i 0 ; at time t = 0. This value is then updated in those time periods when there is an information exchange between individual i and some other individual, say, j.
The updating process is described by
where X(i) is the number of previous meetings for i at which information was exchanged, is exchanged with a non-compliant taxpayer. This form of social custom is added to preferences over income described by a CRRA utility function.
Equilibrium
Having speci…ed individual decision-making and the process of interaction with other individuals, we now turn to the audit strategy of the tax authority. As the benchmark case, we …rst assume a standard random probability of audit: each self-employed individual is audited with the same constant probability; those in paid employment are not audited.
3
We ran simulations for an economy populated by N = 1000 agents with heterogeneous individual characteristics. Each agent is characterized by risk preferences (captured by the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion), wage in employment, skill level in the two selfemployment occupations, a subjective probability of audit, and a weighting of the social custom. As with the simulation in section 3, risk preferences, wage in employment, and skills in self-employment are drawn at the outset and remain …xed for each agents. Furthermore, we retain the assumption that earnings in self-employment are random and that self-employment occupation 2 has a higher mean and variance for equal skills levels.
The subjective probability and the weight on the social custom are updated each period as described above.
At the beginning of every period an agent chooses an occupation, and, if self-employment is chosen, then observes an income realization and decides how much income to declare. Income declarations are randomly audited, and non-compliant taxpayers are …ned if caught.
Agents update their beliefs about audits, meet in the social networks and exchange information (with some probability). This information is used for the secondary update of Figure 6 shows that, indeed, the subjective belief about the probability of audit is the lowest among employed, close to the objective probability at 0:05 (in these simulations), whereas for self-employed it is sustained at a much higher level, about 0:18. This pattern obtains under the target e¤ect assumption on the belief update; under the bomb-crater e¤ect the subjective beliefs are persistent at an even higher Compliance is lower in the riskier occupation: just over 30 percent of agents in selfemployment 2 declare their income honestly, whereas in self-employment 1 the rate is around 50 percent; this illustrates our point about the link between risk-taking in the choice of occupation and in the evasion decision. The overall level of compliance in the economy is around 62 percent. The di¤erences in compliance rates are driven partly by the di¤erences in risk aversion and partly by the di¤erences in attitudes to evasion:
exchanging information with more compliant agents reinforces the importance of the social norm of compliance, and, conversely, interacting with non-compliant agents makes non-compliance feel less unacceptable.
Audit Strategies
The model is su¢ ciently rich to permit a range of questions to be investigated. Of particular interest is the choice of audit strategy by the tax authority. Audits are costly, and the tax authority might be interested in identifying a strategy or a set of strategies that deliver the highest compliance at a given cost, or result in the highest revenue collected net of audit cost. It is natural to ask, for example, whether random audits or audits targeting a particular group of taxpayers, or some mix of both, deliver a higher tax yield in an environment where taxpayers are in ‡uenced in their compliance decisions by their own experience as well as the experience of other taxpayers. In addition to the benchmark case of random audits with constant exogenous probability we consider the optimal number of random audits, alternative audit strategies, and the choice between audit types ("hard", where all concealed income is revealed at a higher cost of audit, or "soft", where only part of concealed income is revealed, but at a lower cost). The focus of this section is on
alternative audit strategies.
We analyze and compare the outcomes of four di¤erent audit strategies: random audits of the self-employed with a …xed probability (Fixed PA), audits of a …xed number of taxpayers in each self-employed occupation (Fixed NA), audits switching between selfemployed occupations each period (Fixed NAA), and audits switching randomly between self-employed occupations (Fixed NAR). Rather than introducing the cost of audits explicitly, we construct the strategies with …xed numbers of audits to match the mean number of audits from the random audit strategy, so that on average over time the total cost of audits is the same for all four strategies. Given the same (average) cost, the best strategy is the one that delivers the largest amount of tax revenue (including the …nes collected from caught evaders). Figure 8 shows the amount of tax and …ne revenues collected in every period for these four di¤erent audit strategies under the assumption of the target e¤ect. The outcome is very similar for the bomb-crater e¤ect. Although no strategy is uniformly better in every period, the strategy with the …xed number of audits for each occupation appears to deliver higher yield more often than the remaining two strategies. This observation This implies that a revenue service with an objective function increasing in tax and …ne revenue (in particular, the total amount of revenue) should prefer this strategy over the other three when maximizing the expected value of the objective function. This …nding seems to be robust to the behavioural assumption on the taxpayers'immediate reaction to an audit.
Conclusions
The compliance decision combines a range of economic, psychological, and social elements. Included amongst these are perceptions of risk and attitudes toward risk-taking, the importance of social standing and conformity to group norms, and the transmission of information through social contacts. A compelling model of the compliance decision requires these components to be combined and embedded within a taxpayer equilibrium.
Agent-based modelling provides the ideal methodology for bringing disparate elements into a cohesive whole. The combination of the agent-based model with the structure of a social network to govern interaction provides a rich environment in which to explore compliance. A particular strength of agent-based modelling is that it has the potential to accommodate complex optimization and information updating processes.
The models that we have presented in this paper emphasize the importance of opportunities for non-compliance, and the link that this creates between occupational choice and risk attitude. Risky forms of self-employment will be chosen by those who are most willing to accept risk and to most fully exploit available opportunities for non-compliance.
As a consequence, compliance behaviour can vary signi…cantly across occupational groups.
The methodology is very ‡exible and is, therefore, able to incorporate recent advances in the theory of compliance. Our work emphasizes the role of attitudes, beliefs and opportunities, and draws ideas from advances in behavioural economics. A further advantage of an agent-based model of tax compliance is that it can incorporate a variety of di¤er-ent intervention strategies by the revenue service. We have contrasted random audits with three alternative strategies and have observed that the strategy with …xed number of audits in each occupation delivers the highest tax yield, keeping the average cost of audits constant across strategies. The strategies considered in this paper are not the only ones available to tax authorities. In particular, these strategies do not make use of the information obtained in the previous rounds of audit. One further direction of research is to explore the e¤ect of predictive analytics, or the use of past information on taxpayers for predicting their future compliance behaviour, on audit outcomes.
Agent-based modelling is certain to become more in ‡uential in economic analysis as increased computing power permits ever greater model sophistication. Properly constructed models will provide an ideal testing place for policy interventions that cannot be immediately tested in practice. Our models show a little of what can be achieved, but much more is possible.
